Problems with Graham\u27s Two Systems Hypothesis by Goldin, Owen
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications Philosophy, Department of
1-1-1989
Problems with Graham's Two Systems Hypothesis
Owen Goldin
Marquette University, owen.goldin@marquette.edu
Published version. "Problems with Graham's Two Systems Hypothesis" in Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy. Ed. Julia Elisabeth Annas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989: 203-213. Publisher
link. © 1989 Oxford University Press. Used with permission.
PROBLEMS WITH GRAHAM'S 
TWO-SYSTEMS HYPOTHESIS 
OWEN GOL DI N 
1. S, and S2 
IN Aristotle's Two S.ystems 1 Daniel G raham has put forward a bold new 
hypothesis concerning the development of Aristotle's thought, which 
he labels ' the Two Systems Hypothesis'. G raham recognizes that the 
interpreter of Aristotle faced with conflicting doctrines sometimes has 
no recourse but to posit a development in Aristotle's thought. But, with 
the notable exception of the speculations of Owen,2 Graham finds 
previous developmental accounts of Aristotle's thought philosophically 
unsatisfactory. T his is because genetic accounts (like those of Jaeger)3 
have typically explained changes in Aristotelian doctrine on the basis of 
a shift in general outlook, not on Aristotle's attempts as a philosopher 
to resolve tensions arising in his earlier views. Graham's book is an 
attempt to give a developmental account of Aristotle's thought in 
metaphysics and philosophy of science without this shortcoming. 
Graham argues that Aristotle's positing of matter was motivated by 
the failure of his earlier ontology to allow one to account for substantial 
change and that the analysis of substance as a composite of matter and 
form is structprcd by the model of the activity of a craftsman. Graham 
shows how the theory of the four causes as it is presented in Physics 2 is 
also structured by this model and how the potentiality/actuality 
distinction was extended to apply to Aristotle's new understanding 
of substantial change. Graham's account both explains. apparent 
discrepancies in Aristotle's views and shows why Aristotle was 
1 (Oxford, 1987). 
1 See G. E. L. Owen, 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in 
I. During and G. E. 1 .. Owen (eds.), AristoJie and Plato in the Mid- Fourth Cent111)' 
(Gi:iteborg, 1960}, and 'The Platonism of Aristotle', Pmrmlings tlthe Aristotelian Sorie~v. 
89 ( 196s). 125-so. 
: Sec \\'. jaeger, Aristotle: Fundmnentals of the 1/istory of his Droelopmmt, trans. 
R. Robinson, 2nd cdn ., (Oxford, 1948). 
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philosophically impelled to <.:hangc his views in the manner in which he 
did. There is much of value here, and y raham's speculations arc 
worthy of close consideration. But here I shall restrict myself t~ just 
one of Graham's basic points, that which is announced in his book's 
very title: the hypothesis that in Aristotle's writings we find two 
complete, independent, and contradictory philosophical systems, each 
with its own ontology and theory of scientific explanation. 
The aspect of this thesis that is bound to be the most controversial is 
the contention that Aristotle's first system (S ,), found in the Organon, 
is not · only different from, but fundamentally contradicts his second 
system (S2 ), which dominates the rest of Aristotle's work. In Graham's 
view there is 'a fault line running down the middle of Aristotle's 
philosophy' (p. viii). He argues that Aristotle never recognized that his 
philosophkal thought underwent such a radical shift, and hence at 
times imports the obsolete principles of S, into the philosophical 
speculations of S 2 • Graham suggests that this is bound to cause 
trouble, since at these times Aristotle's conceptual framework rests on 
a set of contradictory principles. Graham leads up to an analysis of 
the metaphysical ·puzzles of Metaphys£cs Z, which he takes to 
be a manifestation of the philosophical confusions that arise from 
Aristotle's holding contradictory principles. According to G raham's 
analysis, Aristotle knows that he is in trouble, but does not know 
the solution-which would be to cut the problem out by the roots, 
i.e. eliminate the principles of S 1 from his thought. In the penulti-
mate chapter of An"stotle's Two Systems G raham shows 'what Aristotle 
should have said' by sketching the metaphysics of a consistent 
version of s2. . 
Alth0ugh I am pc;:rsuaded by the general outline of Graham's 
developmental account, I believe that his analysis of the logical relation 
between s I and s2 is flawed, and that the difficulties of Metapi~)ISics z 
are deeper than Graham suggests. Therefore I shall restrict my 
comments to these points. I shall firs~ outline some essential 
differences Graham detects between s I and s2. I shall then argue that 
the two systems are not contradictory in the manner G raham suggests; 
rather, s2 is a deeper and mote elaborate account which contains 
all of the teachings of the 'higher-level' S ,. In the terminology of 
contemporary philosophy of science, s I is reducible to s2. Next, I shall 
tum to the shift in Aristotle's theory of explanation detected by 
Gra_ham. I shall claim that to strip the philosophy of science of S 2 of 
the presuppositions of S, would be to have Aristotle abandon his ideal 
----------------------------------· 
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of ultimate explanation, and that there is no evidence that Aristotle was 
ever tempted to move in this direction. 
Graham presents the theses of each of'Aristotle's two systems' in a 
succinct table (pp. 8o-1). H ere I shall mention only those theses 
directly relevant to the discussion at hand. 
The root difference between S , and S2 is one of ontology. In S., 
which Graham calls Atomic Substantialism, the basic things in the 
world arc the primary substances of the Categories. These are those 
concrete substances that we run across in our everyday experience: 
biological entities and other middle-sized things which fall under 
certain natural kinds (p. 26). In S 2 , which Graham calls Hylomorphic 
Substantialism, the theoretically basic entities are no longer such 
middle-sized concrete substances. Rather, concrete substances arc 
themselves to be analysed as complexes of form and matter, and, 
according to Metaphysics Z, it is form that is ultim~tely to be identified 
with primary substance (pp. s8-62). 
While . both s 1 and s2 espouse the independence of 'primary 
substance', what is meant by this phrase differs in each of the two 
theoretical discourses. In S, the term 'primary substance' refers to the 
same beings as does the, phrase 'concrete substance', which is the term 
Graham employs in summarizing S2 to refer to perceptible entities 
. such as Socrates. In S 2 it will not be the concrete substance Socrates 
who serves as a foundation of being, but what S 2 would consider the 
corresponding primary substance, Socrates' form (p. 6o). Graham 
expresses the basic difference in the ontologies of s I and s2 by the 
following principles: SA ·(belonging to S ,), that 'primary substances arc 
ontologically indivisible particulars', and H (belonging to S2 ), that ' the 
concrete substance is composed of form amJ matter' (p. 18o). 
As G raham sees it, this djffercnce in ontology has repercussions in 
the philosophy of science. The central principle of the theory of 
explanation ofS, is labelled SK: 'scientific knowledge is demonstrative 
knowledge.' Tttat is to say, scientific knowledge comes about through a 
certain kind of deduction called a demonstration, whose premisses arc 
'self-evident' and exhibit the cause of the fact expressed in the 
conclusion of the demonstration (pp. 47-8). Demonstrations arc so 
structured that this cause will be expressed in the demonstration's 
middle term, ' the missing link in a chain of universals exhibited by the 
tcm1s of a sequence of syllogisms in a projected demonstrative proof' 
(p. so). Since by and large those premisses which ultimately ground 
demonstrations arc definitional, expressing the essences of objects of 
.. 
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scientific inquiry, demonstrations serve to identify the sort of cause 
indicated in Post. An. 2. I I, 94a34-6, which Graham labels ' the 
essential cause'. -~ Graham argues that, despite Aris totle's best efforts in 
Post. An. 2. 1 1 to show otherwise, the essential cause is the only kind of 
cause that can be made manifest through the demonstrative scheme of 
s, (pp. 158-63). 
In S 2 , as Graham sees it, Aristotle adopts a deeper notion of 
scientific explanation. In this system one adequately explains a fact 
through identifying each of the four causes d escribed in Phys. 2. 3· 
According to Graham, the rigid notion of demonstrations grounded in 
the identification of and deduction from essences plays no part here. 
Rather, in this sort of explanation the relevant metaphysical aspects of 
any entity, attribute, or event are isolated and identified. Graham 
argues that this notion of scientific explanation had to wait until s2 
because its scheme of the four causes is structured around the 'craft 
model' which is the motivation of the metaphysics of S 2 • Graham 
suggests that this is how one can solve a vexed problem of Aristotelian 
scholarship: how to reconcile Aristotle's own prescriptions for 
scientific research and exposition in the Posterior Ana~)'tics with the 
more discursive accounts actually presented in Aristotle's scientific 
researches. According to Graham, Aristotle's scientific treatises arc 
part of S 2 , written at a time in which the S, theory of demonstration 
was already obsolete (even if Aristotle himself was not aware that this 
was so). What we find in these treatises is precisc;ly what Aristotle in 
Metapl~ysics A. 3 and Generation nf A nimals 1. 1 says we should find : 
the identification of each of the four causes responsible for the 
phenomenon unde r consideration ( pp. 3 19-2 3). 
2. Is S. an extension of S,? 
The crux of Graham's argument is that S, .and S2 arc two incompatible 
alternative philosophical systems. Graham first rejects the traditional 
account of the relationship between the Organon and the rest of the 
Aristotelian corpus, that which s tates that the former is, as the name 
Organon implies, a logical tool to be employed in any discourse 
' Graham distinguishes the 'essential cause' ofS, from the ' f(>rmal cause' of 5 2 on the 
grounds that the latter notion i~ dependen t on the correlative notions of matter and form, 
at)sent from S, (pp. 75-6). 
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concerning any subject. According to this view, S 1 docs not itself make 
any substantive philosophic claims and hence docs not conflict with S2 • 
Graham convincingly argues that the Categories docs indeed p resent an 
ontology: it gives an account of the basic entities in the world (primary 
substances), deriv~tive entities (the various kinds of accidents), and the 
relations holding between these (pp. 87-90). 
G raham next rejects what he calls the Extension Hypothesis, 
concerning the relationship between s I and s2. According to this view, 
S 2 is an extension of S, because'S, is only a preliminary statement-
either because it is simplified for the novice or because it does not yet 
take into account the full range of problems that a philosophy has to 
confront' (p. go). I shall here review Graham's criticism of the 
Extension Hypothesis and in the light of this criticism defend a version 
of it. 
Graham's argument against the Extension Hypothesis is as follows. 
He writes, 'in logical theory, one system is an extension of the other if it 
contains .all the axioms of the other and at least one new axiom besides' 
(p. 91 ). An example of this would be the relationship between plane 
geometry and solid geometry. The latter theory is built on the basis of 
the former, but has a more encompassing subject-matter. T his is made 
.. 
possible by additional axjoms which deal with an c>.:panded subject-
matter wi thout contradicting or replacing any of the axioms of the first 
theory.5 Graham argues that this cannot be the relation of S 1 and 
S 2 because a principle of S., SA (that 'primary substances arc 
ontologically indivisible particulars '), is not only absent from s2 but is 
supplanted by the coinradictory principle H (that 'the concrete 
. substance is composed of form and matter'). Two systems whose 
principles so contradict one another cannot stand in the relation of 
theory and extension. Graham likens their relation to that between 
Euclidean and Riemannian geometries; each geometry is partially 
based on an axiom concerning parallel lines which contradicts the 
. axiom of the other. T hey arc incompatible alternatives. So, just as the 
geometer must decide whether to adopt one geometry or another 
within a given inquiry, the metaphysician must, within the context of a 
certain philosophical inquiry, adopt either a theory according to which 
the concrete substance is ontologically indivisible or one according to 
which it is not. Graham argues that problems of substantial change, 
among other considerations, lead Aristotle to a theory of the laner 
' C f: the definitions of boo!- 1 1 of l':uclid's l :'fciiii'I!I.L 
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kind; once Aristotle has arrived at this theory, he can apply the 
principles of the former theory only at th,e risk of contradicting him-
self. 
It is certainly the case that principles SA and H are mutually 
contradictory, and hence S, cannot be an extension of S 2 in the sense 
in which Graham has defined 'extension'. But to posit a theoretical 
chasm between the two theories is not the only alternative, and the fact 
that Aristotle so deftly leaps from one theory to the other should make 
us wary of Graham's proposal. Perhaps S 2 is an extension of S, in a 
looser sense. Perhaps the root contradiction Graham detects between 
S 1 and S 2 is a function of the manner in which the subject-mancr ofS 1 
is limited, and it may be that the metaphysical analysis of change that 
prompts S 2 need not entail the rejection of the core doctrines of S,. To 
see how this is so we need to examine more closely the nature of the 
contradiction to which Graham draws our attention. 
In S 1 a certain kind, i.e. concrete substance, is posited as basic and 
unanalysable. In S 2 that same kind is posited as analysable. Is not the 
relation between concrete substance as conceived in S 1 and concrete 
substance as conceived in S2 the same as that between the atom as 
conceived in classical chemistry and the atom as conceived in 
contemporary physics? In both cases we have on the one hand a theory 
in which a certain theoretical enti ty is posited as basic and 
unanalysablc and on the other hand a theory in which that same entity 
is analysed as a complex of more basic theoretical entities. Although 
we might not be able to properly say that contemporary physics is an 
extension of classical chemistry, surely we would not want to make the 
claim that G raham makes in regard to S, and S 2 : that they arc 
incom.mensurablc and incompatible. Rather, the relationship seems to 
be that which holds between a science _or theory and that to which it is 
reducible. 
What is it for one theoretical system to be reducible to another? If a 
theory A is reducible to .a theory B, one must be able to correlate those 
entities taken to be basic in A with entities or complexes of entities 
taken to be basic in B. Further, by means of these assumptions (which 
express the relations holding between the theoretical entities of the two 
systems) and the principles of B, one mus-t be able to deduce every 
theorem of A.6 Is this the relation ~at holds between the ontologies of 
1
' Sec Ernest Nagel, 771e Structure a/Science (New York, 1961), 353-4. 
... 
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5 1 and 5 2 ?7 There will be only one 'correspondence rule'11 relating the 
ontologies ofS, and 5 2 : that 'primary substance' as employed in 5 1 has 
the same reference as 'composite substance' in S 2 , the synthesis of 
matter and form. That every primary substance falls under a natural 
kind and that such a kind is a species definable as genus and differentia 
are theses of S 1 which, properly interpreted , will prese rve their truth-
value in S 2 • The only thesis of 5 1 that will not preserve its truth-value 
in 5 2 is what Graham calls SA: that 'primary substances arc 
ontologically indivisible particulars'. What are we to make of this 
principle (expressed in Cat. 5, 2 3 1 1 - I 3, as 'primary substances arc 
neither said of nor in anything else')? 
The assertion that a certain entity posited by a theoretical discourse 
is not analysable as a complex of more basic entities is not to be taken 
as an integral principle of th at discourse. For example, one will not qua 
arithmetician identity the monad as the basic _theoretical entity of 
arithmetic. This will be the task of the philosopher of science, such as 
Aristotle_(cf. Post. An. 1. I , 713 15-16; I. 2 , 72a21 - 4 ; 1. 10, 763 34-6). 
Similarly, that 'primary substance' is the basic theoretical entity of S 1 is 
properly taken not as a thesis of S 1 itself, but of a mctatheoretical 
discourse ·explicating tl;l~ logical structure of S 1 • • 
It might be countered d}at in this respect the status of a metaphysical 
discourse is unique, for, unlike other sciences, metaphysics itself 
purports to give the ultimate analysis of beings. But the notion of First 
Philosophy is introduced only in S •. Except for the usc of proti in 
regard to concrete substances in the Categories, there is no indication 
that the level of analysis presented therein is meant to be ultimate. 
I conclude that all that S 1 tells us about the world is also told by 5 2 , 
but S 2 tells us much more. Just as contemporary physics has deepened 
the scientific un·derstanding of the world offered by classical chemistry, 
without rejecting classical chemistry as fundamentally incorrect, so 
with 5 2 Aristotle has deepened, not rejected, the metaphysical 
understanding of the world offered by S 1 • The fact that the one system 
takes a certain kind of entity to be basic while the other does not docs 
7 I restrict the discussion here of whether s I and s2 arc incommensurable to the area 
in which G raham finds the core contradiction between them: ontology. The appare nt 
incompatibility of the logic of the two systems (p. 8o) is also easily explained on the 
grounds I present here. For a discussion of whether the philosophy of science of S 1 is 
incompatible with that of 5 2 , sec sect. 3 below. 
x On the usc of this phrase see W. Sellars, 'Theoretical Explanation', in Philosophical 
Perspectives (Springfield, Ill., 1967), 333· 
.. 
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not entail the two systems' incompatibility. T he propos1t10n that a 
certain theoretical entity cannot be further analysed need not be 
considered an assumption within a theory', but rather can be seen as a 
fact regardt.ng that theory. If we take the S 1 principle of the ontological 
indivisibility of concrete substance as mctathcoretical in this w·ay, the 
fundamental contradiction Graham discerns between s I and s2 
disappears. 
Even if all of the above is admitted, it might be countered that 
Graham is sti11 justified in writing of a major conceptual rift between 
early and later Aristotle. The principles by which S, is supplemented 
arc so radical that S 2 constitutes an entirely new world-view, 
employing a different paradigm. T hus, Graham speaks of the 
transition between s I and S 2 aS a SCientifiC revolution, Similar tO thOSe 
discussed by Kuhn.'1 On this view, there is such a conceptual rift 
between the two systems that there would be no way to translate the 
truths of S, into the vocabulary of 5 2 without doing violence to the 
former. Because the first theory is part of a world-view rejected by 
the second, the conceptual content of the principle of the first theory, 
taken by itself, is different from the conceptual content of the first 
theory understood as part of the more encompassing second theory. 10 
G raham supports his view that there is a radical conceptual ri ft 
between s 1 and s2 by indicating shifts in meaning in both the terms 
and the propositions of the two systems. Graham focuses on the 
following example to highlight the incommensurability of the two 
systems: According to the ontology of the Categrm'es, the fact that 
Socrates is a substance entails that Socrates cannot be either more or 
less what he is,· since substance, taken as ontologically basic, does not 
admit of the more or the less (Cat. s, 3h33-4a1). But, as Graham 
points out, in S 2 an· immature Socrat~s would be ' less of a man', i.e. 
less of a substance, than the mature Socrates. (As Aristotle puts it at 
M etaph. H. 8, I05o·'4-7, the adult is 'prior in form and substance'. 
Because of the conceptual shift between S 1 and S 2 , the above S 1 
statement, interpreted in the theoretical framework of S 2 , contradicts 
the above statement of 5 2 (IOI-3). So even if partisans of s, and s2 
will agree with each other's statement that Socrates is a substance, that 
'' pp. 93- 5, 103. S ec T. Kuhn, 7Yte. Structure of Sdentifir Rt't·olutions, 2nd cdn. 
(Chicago, 1970). 
~~~ This point is based on my unders tanding of remarks made by G raham at the 1 g8H 
U niversity of T exas at Austin Workshop in Ant.;cnt Philosophy. 
Graham's Two-Systems Hypothesis 211 
is only because they do not fully realize what the other side means by 
that statement. · 
Docs the problem not lie in the fact that 'to be more or Jess of a 
certain substance' has not in this example been translated from the 
idiom of one discourse to that of the other? Were the partisan of S 2 to 
understand what the partisan of S 1 means when he denies the 
possibility of one substance's being more or less a substance than 
another entity, surely he would have no objection. For in denying that 
one man can be more or less a man than another, all the partisan of S 1 
means is that for every substantial kind, a particular entity either falls 
under that kind or it does not. T here is no concern here with the 
extent to which cer tain potencies characteristic of that kind have been 
actualized; as Graham points out, the notion of form as actuality is 
alien to S 1 (pp. g8- roo, 183-206). But this is not because the notion 
contradicts anything in S 1 ; it rather belongs to a de~per level of analysis. 
Again, just because, within the theoretical structure of a system, an 
analysis is neither given nor made possible, this docs not mean that this 
is entailed by the core of that system; rather, that there can be no such 
analysis ought to be considered a mctatheoretical fact. T he partisan of 
S2 would agree with the partisan of S, that there is a sense in which no 
one is either more or le~s human than another, but only S2 presents the 
theoretical framework for .discussing the difference in levels in which 
certain potencies characteristic of substantial kinds arc actualized. 11 
3· Demonstration and explanation in S. 
G raham argues that in the philosophy of science, as well as in 
metaphysics, Aristotle's thought underwent a fundamental shift. T he 
notion of essence, which plays a crucial role in the theory of 
explanation of S,, 12 is alien to the craft model of generation, which 
11 Cf. the d ifletcncc in t.he English idioms 'A is more of a man than H' and 'A is more 
human than B'. While it ..:an be said that I am 'more of a man' than my two-year-old son, 
to say that one being is more human than another is properly speaking impossible, for no 
human being is more human than any others. The idiom can be e mployed only 
metaphorically, e.g. in saying that a human H acts like a robot, not d isplaying certain 
h uman faculties that arc indeed possessed, or in sayi ng that a creature A (e.g. a monkey) 
displays abilities more like those of human beings than docs creature 13 (e.g. a guinea-
pig). 
12 As Burnyeat has argued, demonstrations are explanations: sec M . F. Burnycat, 
'Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge' in E. Berti (cd.), Aristotle ou Scieure: 'l11e 
Posterior Analytics (Padua, 1981 ), 97- r 39· ' ('hey arc not mere linguistic entities; rather, 
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motivates 5 2 • Aristotle employs this model to liken the coming into 
being of a substance to the imposition of form on appropriate matter. 
In the most developed version of the theory of the four causes this 
model is to be employed in scientific explanation. For every object of 
inquiry the scientist must seek the analogues to the matter a craftsman 
takes up, the form that is imposed on it, the craftsman himself, and the 
end the craftsman has in mind (pp. 172-81). Aristotle attempts to 
dovetail the two theories by identifying the essence of a thing with its -
formal cause. As we have seen , Graham holds this identification 
partially responsible for the paradoxes of Metapkysics Z. 13 
But suppose that Aristotle had adopted a hylomorphic substantialism 
free of the theory of explanation presented in the PosLerior Analytics. 
What sort of scientific explanation would be possible? There are two 
possibilities. Either explanation would be wholly non-deductive or it 
would be deductive, without resting on indemonstrable first principles. 
In the first case scientific explanation would come about merely 
through the identification of each of the four causes, running down 
them in a list, as it were. Any fact complex enough to be inexplicable 
through the mere-identification of the formal cause of some substances 
would be in principle inexplicable. Take, for example, the biological 
fact considered as explmrandum in Post. An. 2. 16-17: vines shed their 
leaves. Aristotle sketches an explanation which would go something 
like this: the structure of flat-leaved plants necessitates a congealing of 
they arc the vehicle by which there is imparted epistemi (scientific understanding), the 
disposition required for answering certain 'why' questions. For this reason, G raham' 
( p. 81) improperly assigns the thesis BTC ('a cau e is an answer to the que tion Why') to 
s2 alone. . 
u Graham takes this identification to be responsible for two other philosophical 
difficulties as well. T he ·first is what he calls ' the empirical problem'. When actually 
engaged in his b iological researches Aristotle discovers that the ideas of defining 
biological kinds through identifYing ge nus and species is unrealistic; in PA 1. 2-4 
Aristotle argues that a biological definition may need to present more than one 
differentia (245-6). This docs not s trike me as evidence o f the obsolescence of the S, 
theory of ex'Pianation in the context o f real empirical researc h. Rather, Aristotle is 
making a relatively mino r adjustment to the S, theory. The problem that Aristotle finds 
in definitions arrived at through dichotomous divisions is lhat such definitions arc 
inadequate for grounding scientific explanations of the ka/11' !Jauta sumbebikota (the 'in 
itself accidcntals') of the dejinimda. On this sec P. Pellegrin, A ristotle's Classijiallion t{ 
A ninwls: Biolog,, and the Conceptual Unif)' of tlte Aristotelian Corpus, trans. A. Preus 
(Berkeley, 1986), 13-49. So Aristotle is ':JOt here challenging the thesis that scientific 
ex'Pianarions take the form of demonstrations based on indemonstrable definitions. The 
second problem ('the analytic problem') concerns the ontological status of genus and 
diffe rentia. This docs not seem to me to arise from the clash of contradicting systems; it 
arises in S, alone. 
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sap at the juncture of the leaf and the stem; a vine is a flat-leaved plant, 
so this coagulation will occur in a vine. This in turn will lead to the 
vine's having its leaves drop towards the centre of the earth 
(the explanation of which fact will presumably be drawn from the 
principles of chemistry). Much more is involved here than the simple 
identification of each of the four causes. 1"' This explanation is 
deductive. 
Alternatively, scientific explanations in S 2 could be deductive, 
although not demonstrative. That is to say, they would be expressed by 
inferences which do not rest on immediate premisses. Hence, the 
premisses of these deductions would themselves demand explanation. 
This would be to reject ultimacy in explanation, as most contemporary 
philosophers of science have done. This has the consequence of either 
relegating such explanations to instruments allowing one to predict 
future events, or of making the scientific understanding that such 
explanations afford a relative affair; through them one would 
understand more than before, but questions could still be raised 
concerning the truths on which th-at explanation is grounded. There is 
no evidence that Aristotle had contemplated any such position in his 
philosophy of science. Even in S 2 he remains convinced of the ultimate 
intelligibility of the important features of the sublunar realm. Given 
this conviction, the fundamentals of the theory of explanation offered 
in S 1 must find a place in any system of hylomorphic substantialism. 
I have here argued that there is no chasm separating S 1 from S 2 ; the 
latter is rather the maturation of the former. D espite the negative tenor 
of the above remarks; I would like to close by emphasizing what 
is of great value in Graham's book. Although s I and s2 may 
not be incommensurable, both are indeed comprehensive systems of 
metaphysics and philosophy of science. Graham's isolation of the 
principles of the two is noteworthy; so is his account of how Aristotle 
developed the principles of s2 to meet philosophic demands for which 
S 1 is inadequate. Although I have not here discussed these chapters of 
Graham's book, they contain many intriguing and valuable arguments 
worthy of close consideration. 
Marquel/e University, Milwaukee 
H If we are to adopt an S z free of the presuppositions of S, we could not even say that 
this explanation has identified the formal cause of shedding. For in S., as Graham 
conceives it, form has a role only as an ontological componenr of substance, and 
shedding is not a substance. 
